

An adaptive attack on Wiesner's quantum money

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Reference: Brodutch, A.; Nagaj, D.; Sattath, O.; Unruh, D.

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Quantum money

Elitzur-Vaidmans bomb quality tester

Bomb-testing attack on quantum money

Protective Measurement Attack

Comparison of the two attacks

Quantum money

- ▶ *Goal:* Create money which is impossible to forge
- ▶ *Method:* Use quantumsystem
- ▶ *No-Cloning Theorem* should prohibit copying

S. Wiesner proposed system with single-qubit memory and single qubit measurement:

- ▶ Bank creates public serial number s with private key $k^{(s)} \in \{0, 1, +, -\}^n$
- ▶ The Banknote then is $(s, |\$_s\rangle)$ with $|\$ _s\rangle = |k_1^{(s)}\rangle \otimes \dots \otimes |k_n^{(s)}\rangle$

Quantum Money: Security

- ▶ Banknote gets validated by the bank, which measures each qubit in corresponding basis and sends the banknote back after successful validation
- ▶ Measuring in the false basis would change the qubit and later Validation would fail
⇒ Use interaction free measurement
- ▶ *Loophole*: Bank returns correctly validated banknote

Elitzur-Vaidman bomb quality tester

- ▶ General Idea: Detect some property without disturbing it.
⇒ e.g. Detect a photon that never interacted with an object.
- ▶ Using quantum zeno effect
⇒ One can be sure about the system's property
- ▶ Problem: There might be a light activated bomb
- ▶ Principal aim of the algorithm: Reducing the probability of the bomb to detonate but nevertheless gaining information if there is a bomb




Figure: A quality-testing procedure for bombs: run N rounds and end with a measurement of the first register. a) A dud can't explode, and the first register slowly rotates from $|0\rangle$ to $|1\rangle$. b) With a live bomb, we can really trigger the bomb by flipping the second register to $|1\rangle$. This does not happen often as δ is small, and we are much more likely to measure $|0\rangle$ on the second register. The first register is then also projected back to $|0\rangle$.

After first round:

- ▶ Dud: $(\cos \delta |0\rangle + \sin \delta |1\rangle) |0\rangle$
- ▶ Bomb: $\cos \delta |0\rangle |0\rangle + \sin \delta |1\rangle |1\rangle \Rightarrow$ probability of explosion: $\sin^2 \delta$
- ▶ No explosion \Rightarrow both registers get projected to $|0\rangle |0\rangle$

Probability of no Explosion after N steps:

$$(1 - \sin^2 \delta)^N \geq 1 - \frac{\pi^2}{4N}; \quad \delta = \frac{\pi}{2N}$$

- ▶ This behavior is called *quantum Zeno effect*
- ▶ After N steps we measure the first register: $|1\rangle \Rightarrow$ dud, $|0\rangle \Rightarrow$ bomb

Bomb-testing attack on quantum money

- ▶ Goal: Find state of i^{th} qubit $|\alpha\rangle$ of quantum money $|\$\rangle$ without going to jail (changing it)
- ▶ Procedure is similar to Elitzur-Vaidman's bomb tester




Figure: An adaptive attack on Wiesner's quantum money with a strict testing procedure. We can identify whether the qubit $|\alpha\rangle$ is in the state $|+\rangle$ without going to jail (being detected). If we do not identify it, we can use controlled- $(-X)$ instead to test for $|-\rangle$. If we do not detect it either, we just measure the qubit in the computational basis.

What happens to the four possible states with the X -Operation

- ▶ $|0\rangle, |1\rangle$: Flipping maps the states $|0\rangle \leftrightarrow |1\rangle$, this is the "bomb" case
 \Rightarrow Successful validation will keep first register in $|0\rangle$
- ▶ $|+\rangle$: Flip does nothing ("Dud" case) \Rightarrow First register will move to $|1\rangle$
- ▶ $|-\rangle$: Flip gives minus sign. Initial states is $|0\rangle |-\rangle$
 - ▶ First iteration:

$$R_\delta \otimes \mathbb{I} : ((\cos \delta) |0\rangle + (\sin \delta) |1\rangle) |-\rangle$$

$$\text{CNOT} : ((\cos \delta) |0\rangle - (\sin \delta) |1\rangle) |-\rangle$$

First register is rotated by $-\delta$ compared to $|0\rangle$

- ▶ Second iteration will rotate first register back to $|0\rangle$
 \Rightarrow after even number of iteration first register is $|0\rangle$

\Rightarrow We can identify if $|\alpha\rangle$ is in the $|+\rangle$ state

- ▶ We can test for $|-\rangle$ using the controlled- $(-X)$ operation
- ▶ If we can rule out $|+\rangle$ and $|-\rangle$ we can measure in the $\{|0\rangle, |1\rangle\}$ basis
- ▶ We can submit a banknote for validation where all qubits are slightly changed
- ▶ If we want to have a success rate of $1 - f$ we need $N = \frac{\pi^2 n}{2f}$ verification rounds (n : Number of qubits)

Protective Measurement Attack

- ▶ Uses weak interaction between the probe state and the money state with the unitary operator $U = e^{-i\delta(\sigma_x \otimes A)}$
- ▶ At each step the validation protects the money state by projecting it back to its original state with high probability
- ▶ The probe state evolves linear with the weakness parameter δ , whereas the chance of getting caught will be quadratic in δ

Process

▶ $|0\rangle |\alpha\rangle \xrightarrow{e^{-i\delta(\sigma_x \otimes A)}} \approx |0\rangle |\alpha\rangle - i\delta |1\rangle A |\alpha\rangle$

bank measures $\{|\alpha\rangle\langle\alpha|, \mathbb{1} - |\alpha\rangle\langle\alpha|\}$ $\rightarrow \approx \left(e^{-i\delta\langle A \rangle \sigma_x} |0\rangle \right) \otimes |\alpha\rangle$

repeat N times $\rightarrow \approx \left(e^{-i c \langle A \rangle \sigma_x} |0\rangle \right) \otimes |\alpha\rangle$

with $\delta = \frac{c}{N}$

- ▶ The probe system is now rotated proportional to $\langle A \rangle$
- ▶ Then approximate $\langle A \rangle = \langle \alpha | A | \alpha \rangle$ and thus $|\alpha\rangle$

Calculations

- ▶ With $A = P - P^\perp$, the Taylor series of e^P and $P^2 = P$ we get

$$\begin{aligned}
 U &= e^{-i\delta(\sigma_x \otimes A)} = e^{-i\delta(\sigma_x \otimes P - \sigma_x \otimes P^\perp)} = e^{-i\delta\sigma_x \otimes P} e^{i\delta\sigma_x \otimes P^\perp} = \\
 &= (e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes e^P)(e^{i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes e^{P^\perp}) = \\
 &= \left[e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes (\mathbf{1} + (e - 1)P) \right] \left[e^{i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes (\mathbf{1} + (e - 1)P^\perp) \right] = \\
 &= e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes P + e^{i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes P^\perp
 \end{aligned}$$

- ▶ $W |\varphi_k\rangle = (\mathbf{1} \otimes \langle \alpha |) U |\varphi_k\rangle |\alpha\rangle = \sqrt{p_k} |\varphi_{k+1}\rangle =$
 $= (\mathbf{1} \otimes \langle \alpha |) (e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes P + e^{i\delta\sigma_x} \otimes P^\perp) (|\varphi_k\rangle \otimes |\alpha\rangle) =$
 $= (\mathbf{1} \otimes \langle \alpha |) (e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle P |\alpha\rangle + e^{i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle P^\perp |\alpha\rangle) =$
 $= \langle \alpha | P | \alpha \rangle e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle + \langle \alpha | P^\perp | \alpha \rangle e^{i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle$

Calculations

- ▶ $W |\varphi_k\rangle = \langle\alpha|P|\alpha\rangle e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle + \langle\alpha|P^\perp|\alpha\rangle e^{i\delta\sigma_x} |\varphi_k\rangle \Rightarrow$
 $W = \langle\alpha|P|\alpha\rangle e^{-i\delta\sigma_x} + \langle\alpha|P^\perp|\alpha\rangle e^{i\delta\sigma_x} =$
 $= \langle\alpha|P|\alpha\rangle (\cos \delta \mathbb{1} - i \sin \delta \sigma_x) + \langle\alpha|P^\perp|\alpha\rangle (\cos \delta \mathbb{1} + i \sin \delta \sigma_x) =$
 $= \cos \delta \mathbb{1} \langle\alpha|P + P^\perp|\alpha\rangle - i \sin \delta \langle\alpha|P - P^\perp|\alpha\rangle =$
 $= \cos \delta \mathbb{1} - i \sin \delta \langle A \rangle \sigma_x$

- ▶ $\lambda_{\mp} = \cos \delta \mp i \langle A \rangle \sin \delta$
 \Rightarrow eigenstates: $|+\rangle, |-\rangle$

Calculations

$$\blacktriangleright \quad W^N |\varphi_0\rangle = \prod_{k=0}^{N-1} \sqrt{p_k} |\varphi_N\rangle = \sqrt{p_{\text{pass}}} |\varphi_N\rangle$$

$$\begin{aligned} \blacktriangleright \quad \lambda_{\mp}^N &= \left(\underbrace{\cos \delta \mp i \sin \delta \langle A \rangle}_{1+i\langle A \rangle\delta - \frac{\delta^2}{2} - \frac{1}{6}i\langle A \rangle\delta^3} \right)^N = \left(\underbrace{e^{\mp i\delta\langle A \rangle}}_{1+i\langle A \rangle\delta - \frac{\langle A \rangle^2\delta^2}{2} - \frac{1}{6}i\langle A \rangle\delta^3} + \mathcal{O}(\delta^2) \right)^N = \\ &= \left(e^{\mp i\delta\langle A \rangle} (1 + \mathcal{O}(\delta^2)) \right)^N = e^{\mp iN\delta\langle A \rangle} (1 + N \times \mathcal{O}(\delta^2)) = \\ &= e^{\mp ic\langle A \rangle} + \mathcal{O}(N^{-1}) \end{aligned}$$

Calculations

▶ Look at a new Matrix:
$$\begin{pmatrix} \cos(c \langle A \rangle) & -i \sin(c \langle A \rangle) \\ -i \sin(c \langle A \rangle) & \cos(c \langle A \rangle) \end{pmatrix}$$

\Rightarrow eigenvalues: $\cos(c \langle A \rangle) \mp i \sin(c \langle A \rangle) = e^{\mp ic \langle A \rangle}$

▶
$$W^N = e^{-ic \langle A \rangle \sigma_x} + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right) \quad (\text{rotation with phase shift})$$

▶
$$\sqrt{p_{\text{pass}}} |\varphi_N\rangle = e^{-ic \langle A \rangle \sigma_x} |\varphi_0\rangle + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right) |\tilde{\varphi}\rangle$$

▶
$$\Rightarrow p_{\text{pass}} = 1 - \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right)$$

▶
$$\begin{aligned} |\varphi_N\rangle &= e^{-ic \langle A \rangle \sigma_x} |\varphi_0\rangle + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right) |\varphi_I\rangle = \\ &= \cos(c \langle A \rangle) |0\rangle - i \sin(c \langle A \rangle) |1\rangle + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right) |\varphi_I\rangle \end{aligned}$$

Approximating $\langle A \rangle$ and thus $|\alpha\rangle$

- ▶ After N validation rounds with weak coupling ($c = \frac{\pi}{8}$):

$$|\varphi_N\rangle = \cos\left(\frac{\pi}{8}\langle A \rangle\right) |0\rangle - i \sin\left(\frac{\pi}{8}\langle A \rangle\right) |1\rangle + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right) |\tilde{\varphi}\rangle$$

- ▶ Estimate $\langle A \rangle$ by measuring the probe state in the σ_y basis:

$$\bar{p}_{y+} = \frac{1}{2} \left[1 - \sin\left(\frac{\pi}{4}\langle A \rangle\right) \right] + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right)$$

- ▶ Repeat estimation $m \ll N$ times to get:

$$\left| \langle A \rangle - \frac{4}{\pi} \arcsin\left(1 - 2p_y^{(m)}\right) \right| \leq \nu + \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{1}{N}\right)$$

- ▶ Overall failure probability is $p_{\text{fail}} = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{m}{N}\right)$

Example: the four Wiesner money states

- ▶ Choose $A = \sigma_x$, $c = \frac{\pi}{2}$ and $|\varphi_0\rangle = |0\rangle$
- ▶ $\langle 0|\sigma_x|0\rangle = \langle 1|\sigma_x|1\rangle = 0$ and $\langle +|\sigma_x|+\rangle = -\langle -|\sigma_x|-\rangle = 1$
- ▶ Thus if $|\alpha\rangle$ was initially $|+\rangle$ or $|-\rangle$,
the final probe state will be $W^N|0\rangle = \mp i|1\rangle$
- ▶ If $|\alpha\rangle$ was $|0\rangle$ or $|1\rangle$, the probe state will remain close to $|0\rangle$
- ▶ By measuring the final probe state $|\varphi_N\rangle$ we can identify the basis of the money state, which allows us to measure the money state $|\alpha\rangle$ in that basis directly

Comparison of the two attacks

- ▶ BT-attack does not work for general unknown states or if the range of states is continuous
- ▶ PM-attack does not have this problem, but in general only estimates the money state (however modifications like in our example can be used to identify a state instead of estimating it)
- ▶ In the processes suggested by this paper the BT-attack does not have an advantage over the PM-attack in terms of resources, but neither methods are optimized (might be an advantage for the BT-attack in the future)